The Mispricing Game: Systematic Edge in Kalshi Politics Contracts

The Mispricing Game is a professional, probability-first guide to extracting consistent edge from political prediction markets by exploiting how crowds systematically misprice outcomes. Political markets are not forecasting engines. They are emotional exchanges driven by tribal loyalty, narrative momentum, polling anchors, and overreaction to headlines. These forces push prices away from true probability in repeatable ways. This book shows how those distortions form, why they persist, and how disciplined traders position against them. Rather than predicting winners, you'll learn how to identify where the market is wrong. The book breaks down how polling consensus becomes a false anchor, why debates and news cycles trigger predictable price overshoots, how YES/NO asymmetry affects execution, and when liquidity and timing create or destroy edge. It emphasizes position architecture, fee awareness, and patience so small advantages can compound across an election cycle. Written with zero partisanship and a sharp analytical voice, The Mispricing Game treats political contracts as probability distributions—not belief statements. It is designed for serious traders who want process over prediction and edge over opinion.