The Implications of Evolution for Metaphysics: Theism, Idealism, and Naturalism

After the nineteenth-century “turn from idealism,” when idealist philosophies were largely abandoned for materialist ones, many analytic philosophers have adhered to scientific naturalism as the new orthodoxy, largely due to the success of scientific advancements. The New Atheists, such as Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins, claim it is Darwin who deserves much of the credit for repudiating the traditional Mind-first world view. In The Implications of Evolution for Metaphysics: Theism, Idealism, and Naturalism, David H. Gordon explores questions such as: Is it true that evolution is incompatible with theism and necessarily results in naturalism? Is it possible, as naturalism maintains, that everything can be reduced to physical processes? Or are there too many recalcitrant phenomena that defy reduction? Can the epistemological conditions for metaphysical knowledge be met? If the underdetermination of theory allows for multiple metaphysical theories to cover the same phenomena, with each offering an epistemically adequate explanation, then neither naturalism nor theism can be asserted to be objectively true. Nevertheless, it is possible to favor one over the other based on overall coherence and explanatory power.