Planning for the Wrong Pandemic: Covid-19 and the Limits of Expert Knowledge

The fractious and disorganized governmental response to the coronavirus pandemic in the United States prompted many observers to ask: why was the country—which had the knowledge, resources, and plans to deal with such an event—caught so unprepared? Critics pointed to a number of candidates for blame: a President who was dismissive of scientific expertise and indifferent to the task of leading government response; a fragmented media landscape that enabled misinformation to prosper; a slow-footed health bureaucracy incapable of flexible response; and social disparities that heightened inequities in the impact of disease.   Planning for the Wrong Pandemic takes a different approach. Without dismissing such accounts, it begins with the observation that much of the governmental and expert response to the pandemic had been envisioned and planned for in advance. Moreover, many of these plans were implemented in the early stages of the pandemic. As authorities responded to the crisis, they relied on an already-formulated set of concepts and tools that had been devised for managing a future emergency. These pre-existing tools enabled officials to make sense of the event and to rapidly implement policies in response. But they also led to significant blind spots.   This book asks: under what circumstances were these planning tools developed? What did they enable experts, officials, and the public to see, and what did they hide from view? And, finally, as we assess the failures in our response to the pandemic and attempt to prepare for “the next one,” to what extent should we take for granted the capacity of these tools to guide future interventions effectively?